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Abstract 
One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to 
appeal to the involvement of spatial attention. While the sceptic is correct that some putative 
cases are accurately deflected in this way, the rejoinder oversimplifies the possible roles that 
attention might play in relevant contexts. This paper identifies alternative ways that selective 
attention might play a role in cognitive effects on perception. What emerges is a plausible and 
well-evidenced mental schema that describes attention-mediated cognitive penetration. 
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Researchers in philosophy and cognitive science debate whether cognitive or “higher-level” 
states like belief, desire, and intention influence, in some important way, sensory experience: 
whether perception is cognitively penetrable. Does the very look of an object, say a painting, vary 
from perceiver to perceiver in a way that depends upon those perceivers’ background beliefs, 
desires, values? This paper offers a new framing of an important point of the debate, how 
attention may or may not mediate cognition and perception in a way compatible with cognitive 
penetration.   
 
§1 offers brief clarification of the cognition/perception distinction and cognitive penetration. §2 
identifies one common rejoinder to alleged cases of cognitive penetration, the “attention-shift 
interpretation”, and identifies alternative ways that attention could mediate cognition and 
perception, and plausibly amount to cognitive penetration. The aim here is partly to shift the 
burden of proof to the sceptic of cognitive penetration, but also to make a case for attention-
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mediated cognitive penetration by appeal to some recent empirical research. §3 concludes with 
lessons that re-frame the relevant dialectical space. This analysis illuminates various features of 
attention and its relation to both cognition and phenomenal consciousness, and therefore should 
be of interest to a broad range of theorists of the mind. 
 
1. Characterizing cognitive penetration 
There is no uncontroversial way to define the terms ‘perception’ and ‘cognition’. For present 
purposes, a standard pair of lists can be given, followed by a stipulated but orthodox 
characterization. Perception includes sensory experiences: seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, 
touching. Cognition includes beliefs, intentions, goals, and perhaps desires and decision-making. 
Typically, perceptual experiences involve activity in one or more sensory organs, the presence of 
some relevant external stimuli, and involve rich first-personal phenomenology. Cognitive states 
require neither current sensory activity in any particular modality nor the presence of relevant 
external stimuli, and if they involve phenomenology at all, it is relatively impoverished. 
 
Uncontroversial types of perceptual-cognitive interaction are familiar and pervasive. First, causal 
interaction runs from perception to cognition. What you see, hear, and otherwise sense, affects 
the cognitive states you form: your beliefs, your intentions for action, the decisions you make. 
The causal arrow also runs the other direction: your beliefs, intentions, desires, via the 
performance of action, cause changes in your sensory experiences. 
 
The controversial possible interaction between perception and cognition is this. Can cognition 
affect perception in more direct or more important ways (for example, without the mediation of 
a series of actions)? Suppose that you and I are looking at the same object (say a painting) or the 
same event (say a possible hand ball foul in a football match). Can the first-personal, subjective 
qualities of our respective visual experiences differ because we hold different beliefs or values? 
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The dominant view in the last several decades of empirically informed philosophical theorizing is 
that cognition does not penetrate perception in this way. 
 
For human vision, audition, and so on, there is a dominant set of norms, a convergence on 
colour discrimination, tone discrimination, and so on. And once developed to maturity, 
perceptual systems work rapidly and with no person-level effort, and most typically provide 
accurate representations. This has encouraged many theorists to think that perceptual systems 
must be biologically hard-wired, processing limited, modality-specific classes of information. 
Input from other non-sensory parts of the mind would undermine the observed cross-perceiver 
convergence on discrimination, speed, and objectivity and so, by inference to the best 
explanation, perceptual systems must be largely functionally independent. Therefore, perception 
is cognitively impenetrable. Or at the very least, our default should be scepticism about cognitive 
penetration actually occurring.1  
 
The contrary claim has seen multiple definitions. One challenge is that given a particular case, 
extant, distinct definitions yield different verdicts: one definition will say of a case that it is 
cognitive penetration, and another definition, that it is not. This kind of theoretical cross-talk 
thwarts progress. One method to capture a unified meaning across extant definitions appeals to 
the alleged consequences of the possible phenomenon. 
 
First, an interest in cognitive penetration traces back to a concern about possible theory-
ladenness—whether background theoretical commitments affect perception in such a way that 
the rational role of perception in scientific theory choice is threatened [Hanson 1958, 1969; 
Kuhn 1962]. This consequence generalizes to a second one concerning everyday, empirical 
                                                
1 The two standard defenders of this kind of view are Jerry Fodor [1983, 1984, 1985, 1988] and Zenon Pylyshyn 
[1980, 1984, 1999] And, with varying degrees of commitment, there have been numerous more recent examples. See 
Burnston and Cohen [2015]; Gross et al. [2014]; Machery [2015]; Raftopoulos [2001]. 
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knowledge. If one sees or otherwise perceives in ways infected by what one wants or 
antecedently believes, then the knowledge providing role of perception is threatened (or at least 
affected)[ Lyons 2011; Siegel 2012, 2013; Stokes 2012; Silins 2016]. The final consequence 
concerns mental architecture, most centrally, the modularity theory of mind. Strong versions of 
this theory countenance perceptual systems as informationally encapsulated. Information from 
cognitive systems—reasoning, decision making, beliefs, goals—remains partitioned off from 
perceptual systems. Thus evidence for cognitive penetration—a violation of informational 
encapsulation—threatens revision of this model of mental architecture.  
 
These consequences yield a debate-neutral working characterization of cognitive penetration. 
The phenomenon of interest is a cognitive-perceptual relation that implies one or more of these 
three consequences. Cognitive penetration involves some non-trivial cognitive effect on 
perceptual experience, where this effect plausibly results in consequences either for the epistemic 
role of perception (in the scientific or the everyday case), or the architecture of perception. 
Notice how the central emphasis here is on perceptual experience, by contrast to subpersonal 
perceptual processing.2 Notice also how this allows for a variety of mental phenomena that “count 
as” phenomena of interest, since distinct phenomena may imply distinct consequences.3  
 
The value of the working consequentialist characterization is illustrated by how it engages with 
standard sceptical replies to alleged cases of cognitive penetration. There are a number of 
standard replies—the judgment interpretation, memory interpretation, intra-perceptual 
                                                
2 In this respect, the primary emphasis of the current project differs from that of a few of the only other extant 
discussions of attention and cognitive penetration. The central emphasis here is on conscious perceptual experience. 
By contrast, Raftopoulos [2001], Cecchi [2014], and Wu [forthcoming] centrally emphasize whether cognition can 
affect computational processes of vision via attentional modulation.   
3 This consequentialist approach, defended in Stokes [2015], need not be assumed for the analysis given in this 
paper. As discussed in §2 below, there is an alternative way of analyzing attention-involving cases of perception such 
that they involve a direct, internal relation between cognition and perception and thus are, plausibly, cognitive 
penetration. 
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interpretation (see Macpherson [2012]; Stokes [2013]; Stokes and Bergeron [2015]). The interest 
here is in the attention-shift interpretation.  
 
Jerry Fodor gives the attention-shift interpretation in numerous places [1983; 1984; 1985; 
1988](see also Pylyshyn [1999: 358, 364]). Suppose one alleges that one’s ability to see the duck-
rabbit image sometimes as a duck and sometimes as a rabbit is a case of cognitive penetration	
(see Figure 1)[Churchland 1988]. The sceptic can grant that here cognition is affecting 
perception, but only through shifts in spatial attention—that is, changing the focal space to 
which one, in this case, visually attends. Fodor writes, “one squints to make things look sharper; 
one cups one's hand behind one's ear to make them sound louder, etc. It doesn't begin to follow 
that auditory and visual acuity are cognitively penetrable” [Fodor 1988: 190-1].  
 
 
Figure 1 
Appeal to consequences is instructive here. Fodor’s reasoning might concern either of two 
possible features of attention shifting. First, shifts in attention are often actions in the 
philosopher’s sense. Fodor describes the duck-rabbit case in precisely this way: cognitive states 
cause action, and those actions affect what information reaches sensory receptors, which in turn 
affects perception. This bears no important consequences for the epistemology or alleged 
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modularity of perceptual systems or experience. Second, agency aside, shifts in attention involve 
a change in the visual spatial array of attention. Here cognition changes the visual spotlight or 
focus and accordingly changes the information available for perception. Again Fodor can charge 
that this bears no consequence for the epistemic role of perception, nor any obvious implication 
for the alleged modularity of perceptual systems. Instead, it is just a change in the input to those 
systems, by contrast to an encapsulation-violating effect on the computational processing of 
those systems.   
 
Grant for the sake of argument that if the attention-shift interpretation best explains a case then 
the sceptic is right, the case in question is not cognitive penetration. But what is the scope of the 
attention-shift interpretation? Sceptics like Fodor and Pylyshyn assume that a shift in spatial 
attention is the only relevant way that attention might be involved in cognitive-perceptual 
phenomena. This assumption is mistaken.  
 
2. How can attention mediate cognition and perception? 
How may attention count against, versus be neutral with respect to (if not count for), explaining 
a phenomenon as cognitive penetration? The standard attention-shift interpretation 
countenances a scenario where a perceiver has certain cognitive states that cause a shift in 
attention and that shift clearly changes what the perceiver sees. This scenario is captured by a 
simple, mental causal schema:  
 
(a) Cognitive state  ➔ Attention-shift ➔Perceptual experience 
 
One way to understand attention-shifting is as an intentional bodily action. Second, and non-
exclusively, attention-shifting can be understood as a shift in spatial attention: a change in the 
spatial visual field attended, to the focal spotlight. And again, let’s grant that the sceptic is correct 
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to claim that if a case is best explained in terms of (a), then it is not a case of cognitive 
penetration.4  
 
Are all attention-involving, cognitive-perceptual phenomena best described in terms of schema 
(a)? To motivate a negative answer to this question, affirmative answers for each of the following 
questions must be given: 
  Q1: Can attention (or attentional mechanisms) operate in a non-agential way?  
  Q2: Can attention change without changes in spatial attention? 
Q3: Can these non-spatial attentional mechanisms be influenced or partly driven 
by cognitive states? 
 
  Q4: Do these non-spatial attentional mechanisms influence conscious  
  perceptual experience?  
 
In response to Q1, it should be obvious that attention can be guided without one's trying or 
intending to do any guiding. Some objects or events grab attention—a snake popping out of the 
brush, one’s name mentioned on the opposite side of the room, a sharp pain in one’s foot. And 
this comports well with the most dominant, general categories of scientific theorizing about 
attention. Bottleneck theories [Broadbent 1958], Feature-binding theories [Triesman and Gelade 
1980], and Competition-based theories [Desimone and Duncan 1995] are broadly unified by the 
following thread: attentional mechanisms serve to select perceptible features, objects, and events, 
and often automatically. This suffices to answer ‘yes’ to Q1. 
 
Q2 asks, can attention change without changes in spatial attention? Attention is used, 
intentionally and non-intentionally, as a way to search, recognize, and inspect one’s environment. 
One clear way this occurs involves focused attention to some region of space in the visual field, 
                                                
4 It would be more accurate, then, to replace ‘attention-shift’ in schema (a) with either ‘focal attention shift’ or 
‘intentional/spatial attention shift’ (and the schema, again, should be read that way). However, schema (a) has been 
termed in keeping with the standard terminology in the relevant literature, which widely discusses the ‘attention shift 
interpretation’. Thank you to an anonymous referee for emphasizing this qualification.   
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for example, the region where one might expect to find the object of one’s visual search. This is 
one standard account of spatial attention—the “spotlight of attention”—and it’s the account 
assumed by the Fodorian sceptic. But it should be unsurprising that attentional selection can 
instead involve enhanced sensitivity to features of one’s environment (like colour or shape), or to 
whole, bound objects in one’s environment. And this sensitivity can be enhanced in behaviourally 
relevant ways. Over the last few decades, there has been substantial empirical research on both of 
these last two mechanisms of selective attention: on object-based attention (OBA) and feature-based 
attention (FBA).  
 
The earliest work on object-based attention comes from Neisser and Becklen [1975]. 
Experimenters asked subjects to view a screen with two distinct, spatially overlapping videos. In 
one version of the study, one video depicted two sets of hands playing a hand-slapping game, 
and the second video depicted a group of people passing around a basketball. When subjects 
were tasked in a way specific to one video—for example, to count the number of basketball 
passes—they would miss events taking place in the other video. The videos in this experiment 
are spatially superimposed and so if attention was operating just on the basis of a spatial position 
(or “spotlight”), then subjects should not be blind to changes in those positions. But in fact, 
robust inattentional blindness occurs. This is best explained by appeal to an attentional mechanism 
that responds to objects and does so independently of spatial attention (see Scholl [2001]). 
 
In visual search, attentional selection is sometimes guided by relevant features of the 
environment. Suppose you are searching a crowded baggage claim area for a missing piece of 
bright pink luggage. Feature-based attention operates in such a way that when scanning this 
visual array, pink-ish features of the array are favoured for perceptual representation at the 
neglect of other features. Pink-ish features enjoy a brief pop-out effect to aid in search. 
Importantly, like OBA, FBA can operate independently of spatial attention: FBA will highlight 
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relevant features both “within and outside the current spotlight of attention” [Treue and 
Martinez-Trujillo 2007: 175](See also Scolari et al. [2014]; White and Carrasco [2011]. 
 
So, in answer to Q2: both OBA and FBA can function, selecting objects or features, without any 
change in spatial attention.5 Note further that these selection mechanisms can operate in non-
agential ways. Q3 then asks if these mechanisms can be modulated by cognition and, Q4, 
whether these mechanisms function in such a way to influence conscious perceptual experience. 
 
Consider Where’s Waldo? puzzles: overwhelmingly busy visual scenes where one is tasked to find 
Waldo, who is typified by matching red and white striped sweater and cap, and round spectacles. 
This cognitive-perceptual situation is plausibly interpreted as follows. The practiced Where’s 
Waldo? puzzler has a number of relevant cognitive states: a belief that there is an object in the 
scene with Waldo’s typical features, an expectation to find items with those features, an intention 
to find those typical features. FBA then functions in such a way that behaviourally relevant 
features (red and white striped items) are rapidly selected at the expense of non-relevant features. 
This suggests a ‘yes’ to Q3. This cognitively enhanced activity in FBA then results in or amounts 
to enhanced perceptual representation—pop-out—of some features at the neglect of others. 
This is an effect on conscious perceptual experience (a ‘yes’ to Q4).   
 
In this case, cognitive states like belief and intention affect conscious experience, by modulating 
intermediate (but non-agential, spatially independent) selective attention. Contrast this with the 
naive Where’s Waldo? viewer, tasked to simply inspect the same visual scene. This subject will not 
(immediately) form the relevant cognitive states, will not enjoy FBA-driven search and, finally, 
                                                
5 Another way to mark this distinction is in terms of focused vs. distributed attention. Attention can be focused on 
one region or space. Or, attention can be distributed across features or objects within a region of space. Putting the 
current points in these terms, distributed attention (to features or objects) can change without any change to the 
focus (the space) of attention.  
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will not enjoy the resulting, enhanced perceptual representation. Whatever one says about this 
anecdotal case, what’s crucial to note is that the sceptic cannot invoke the attention-shift 
interpretation in response. A case of this kind (involving the non-naive viewer) does not involve 
shifting (intentionally or not) attention from one space to another. Instead, it is plausibly 
characterized by an alternative causal schema:  
 
 (b) Cognitive state  ➔  Non-agential selective attention➔ Perceptual experience 
Now consider schema (b) in light of three recent, related experimental studies.  
 
Moores et al. [2003] found that object representations and associated cognitive representations 
influence attentional selection in visual search tasks. The basic experimental structure went as 
follows. Subjects were placed before a computer screen in a dimly lit room, viewing the screen at 
a distance of roughly 57cm. Subjects were cued with an instruction for visual search, for example 
the target item might be MOTORBIKE. Subjects would then see a fixation cross, followed by 
time variable presentation (sometimes as brief as 100ms) of an array of four images. Sometimes 
the target item was present and in other trials absent. Additionally, in some experimental trials, 
amongst the visual array was a semantically related but visually non-resembling image (a 
HELMET image when the target was MOTORBIKE). Subjects would then receive a masking 
screen, or a fixation cross, and then might be tasked to report whether the target image was 
present or absent, and/or be asked to make a forced choice concerning which of two items was 
recently seen. (For illustrations of trial structures, see Moores et al. [2003: 183, 185]).   
 
Images semantically related to the search target were better recalled and identified, and these 
images sometimes hindered target identification and reduced recall of unrelated distractor 
images. These researchers hypothesize that selective attention is being captured in a way 
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independent of the search task but that depends upon information about relations of meaning, 
stored in long term memory. 
 
The same researchers found that semantically related images modulated saccadic eye movement.6 
Saccades were more typically directed at images semantically related with the explicit search 
target, at the near exclusion of unrelated distractors. And in trials where a related image was 
present in the visual display, the probability that the first saccade went toward the target is 
significantly reduced, and by contrast to control trials with no semantically related image where 
initial saccades are dominantly towards the search target image (the mean onset latency of the 
first saccade was 306ms)( see also Belke et al. [2008]; Gazzaley and Nobre [2012]). This is rapid, 
non-deliberate selection of attention that is sensitive to semantic relationships.  
 
In a second set of studies [Meyer et al. 2007], subjects again performed a visual search over a 
time-limited visual array. The relevant difference is that on some trials, included in the visual 
array was an image of an object with an homophonous name. For example, if the target item was 
a BOW (weapon), on some trials an image of a BOW (ribbon) was present. The related images 
here are neither visually resembling, nor semantically related (the respective terms for a bow 
weapon and a bow of ribbon stand in no semantic relations). In line with the Moores et al. 
results, Meyer et al. found that when present, images with homophonous names (shared with the 
target) more quickly receive attention, are better recalled and identified, and tend to slow overall 
response time. Here again eye tracking studies corroborate: the first saccade after display onset 
(onset latency averaging between 211 and 220 msec) was more likely to go to the related 
                                                
6 Humans produce an average of 3-5 saccades per second, and saccades take an average of 100-200ms. Saccades can 
be voluntary, as when one intends to shift one’s gaze to another part of the room. But they also occur involuntarily 
or “reflexively”. These movements are ballistic: once a saccade is initiated (voluntarily or reflexively), it cannot be 
adjusted mid-saccade (e.g. if the target moves). 
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(homophonous) image than unrelated distractors, and the target was less likely to remain fixated 
if there was a related image present in the visual array.   
 
Finally, these studies have been corroborated by neurological studies using 
electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings. In these studies, Telling et al. [2009] used 
measurements of N2pc amplitudes. The N2pc is an event-related potential (ERP), and is a 
standard measure for fairly rapid activity in response to visual stimuli, typically around or before 
200ms. In brief, what these researchers found was that semantically related (but visually non-
resembling) distractor items affected the magnitude and onset latency of this EEG component. 
This cortical activity is fast, and so it is improbable that it is attentional selection consistently 
done by, in any intentional way, the perceiver. Here it is worth stressing some relevant features 
of N2pc research. First, using MEG neuroimaging techniques, researchers identify the N2pc 
component as largely correlating with activity in extrastriate cortex, including visual area V4 
[Hopf et al. 2000]. Activity in the latter visual cortical area has long been taken to be modulated 
by (or correlated with) selective attention [Moran and Desimone 1985]. Furthermore, recent 
research suggests that N2pc amplitudes are not correlated with shifts in spatial attention [Kiss et 
al. 2008]. Thus semantic information stored in long term memory appears to be modulating 
rapid neural processing that occurs, by our best neuroscientific models, in the visual system.  
 
Now recall, Q3 asks: Can these non-spatial (selective) attentional mechanisms be influenced or 
partly driven by cognitive states? What all of these experimental studies converge on—from 
behavioural to eye-tracking to neurological studies—is that non-targeted but linguistically related 
images have a significant effect on visual search. The difference made by semantically and 
homophonously related images requires explanation. The methodology used, including the use 
of the N2pc EEG component, suggests that the difference is not well explained by shifts in 
spatial attention. Since representation of linguistic relations is not merely (or even) perceptual, 
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even if “low-level” or “fast” or even “encapsulated”, the difference is not explained as a merely 
perceptual (that is, non-cognitive) one. And finally, the eye-tracking and EEG results suggest 
that the difference is not explained as a mere post-perceptual difference in judgment or memory. 
Instead the data suggests important effects both at the level of saccadic eye movement, and in 
extrastriate cortical activity, both of them part of visual processing if anything is.  
 
As Meyer et al. describe it, the “data suggest that there is sufficiently rapid access to conceptual 
information from distractors for this information to influence the first fixations made during 
search” [2007: 715]. Recall that these first saccades averaged (in these studies and the Moore et 
al. [2003] studies) an onset latency between 200 and 306ms. It is not just the fact that the effect is 
rapid that is important, but the fact that linguistically related distractors are both task-irrelevant 
and visually non-resembling to the relevant target images. In this regard, saccadic movements to 
distractors are not deliberate but instead involve an “automatic" spread of attention [Meyer et al. 
2007: 710]7   
 
This latter explanation comports well with an explanation in terms of selective attention, with 
emphasis on feature-based attention. Typically, researchers of FBA focus on low-level features 
like colour or motion, and how selection of these features may be modulated in behaviourally 
relevant ways. However, the data in these studies suggest that linguistic features (for example, 
that the image stands in a semantic relation with the search target) are operative, such that 
features (or objects) associated with those linguistic features are somehow enhanced. When 
searching for a MOTORBIKE image, features of semantically related images (like those of a 
HELMET image) are deemed relevant by the cognitive system and, accordingly, are selected for 
                                                
7 One might object that these studies are just yet another bit of evidence for semantic priming. Here are two 
additional qualifications against that rejoinder. First, the effects here are not all behaviourally enhancing, as priming 
effects often are (see Moores et al. [2003: 187-8]; Meyer et al. [2007: 714]). Second, the effects here are not, as 
priming is often defined, (mere) effects on memory. This is precisely the claim to be defended in reply to Q4. 
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attention at the cost of unrelated distractors. In brief, this would be working memory somehow 
modulating feature selection in favour not of relations of visual similarity to the target, but in 
favour of linguistic relations. This is an extension of the standard model of feature based 
attention, but it gains plausibility from the data for the simple reason that it best explains that 
data. 
 
Q4 asks: do these non-spatial (selective) attentional mechanisms influence conscious perceptual 
experience? As forms of selective attention, FBA and OBA can affect perceptual salience 
without the perceiver performing any action to bring about the changes, and without any change 
to or manipulation of features of the environment. These perceptual changes can take a number 
of forms. Most simply, a feature or object that pops out is experienced sometimes at the 
exclusion of, or longer than, other stimuli in the array. Selective attention also effects changes in 
perceptual organization. Consider the Rubin Goblet (see Figure 2). Even holding the stimulus 
fixed in your spatial attentional spotlight, you experience a phenomenal difference between 
seeing the image as a goblet and seeing the image as two faces in a face-off. This is a perceptual 
change that you can deliberately bring about. But it is entirely plausible that selective attentional 
mechanisms, when operating non-agentially, bring about similar changes: changes in what 
features or objects are figure(s) versus ground, and what features or objects are focally versus 
peripherally represented.  
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Figure 2 
 
Recent theorists have suggested that attention serves to structure or organize conscious experience 
[Watzl 2011; Wu 2014, Ch. 4]. This observation traces back to gestalt psychology and continental 
phenomenology. It is clearly articulated by Sartre. “When I enter this cafe to search for Pierre, 
there is formed a synthetic organization of all the objects in the café, on the ground of which 
Pierre is given as about to appear. […] [I]f I should finally discover Pierre, my intuition would be 
filled by a solid element, I should be suddenly arrested by his face and the whole cafe would 
organize itself around him as a discrete presence” [Sartre 1943: 9-10]. Should Sartre find, 
attentionally select, Pierre’s face, it is clear that Pierre’s face would take up the central, focal 
position in Sartre’s conscious experience. More interestingly, it is around this one object or 
feature—Pierre’s face—that Sartre’s conscious visual experience is then organized. So, it is 
crucial to note not just that there is a centre or a priority space of attention, but that there are 
various other features of the perceptual array that are organized by relation to that centre. These 
components are no less a part of the phenomenology of experience. And the selections that 
attention makes determine how all of these components are structured. 
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The explanation in reply to Q3 regarding the discussed experimental studies extends to a reply to 
Q4 as follows. The semantically and linguistically related items receive attention at the exclusion 
of unrelated distractors, or for periods longer than those distractors (as suggested by the eye-
tracking studies). This is the simplest perceptual effect, showing up in the relevant subjects’ 
performance on recall tasks. It is also plausible that these attentional selections influence the 
structure of conscious experience in the ways just described. For example, the targeted 
MOTORBIKE image might take the centre of attention, with the HELMET image “pulling” 
dominantly at the periphery of experience. And this experience enjoys a distinctive 
phenomenology: it feels different to have something peripheral pulling attention from your focus 
vs. a case where attention is perfectly focalized.  These are attention-modulated perceptual 
differences that causally depend upon the cognitive, linguistic representations stored in long term 
memory.  
 
Brief reminder of the dialectic is useful here. The central question is: how may attention count 
against, versus be neutral with respect to (if not count for), explaining a phenomenon as 
cognitive penetration? This question can be approached by asking whether all attention-
involving cognitive-perceptual phenomena are best explained in terms of the attention-shift 
interpretation (causal schema (a))? To answer ‘no’ to this last question, an affirmative answer 
must be motivated for questions Q1-Q4. This has now been done, and by appeal to both 
anecdotal and experimental evidence. This analysis grounds the second causal schema:  
 
 (b) Cognitive state  ➔  Non-agential selective attention➔ Perceptual experience 
 
The very same evidence and considerations that motivated affirmative answers to Q1-Q4, 
suggest that we have compelling evidence for actual psychological phenomena that are best 
described in terms of schema (b). It should be clear by this stage of the analysis that a 
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phenomenon that fits (b) would not, for inclusion of a central role of attention, count against that 
phenomenon being cognitive penetration. The final step in the analysis is to argue that any 
phenomenon that is best described in terms of (b) is best explained as cognitive penetration. 
 
Cognitive penetration is often theorized as involving a direct cognitive effect on perception. 
Pylyshyn [1999] and Fodor [1988] at least implicitly assume this in their claim that cognitive-
perceptual effects involving active shifts in spatial attention do not count as cognitive 
penetration. Cases involving spatial attention shifts fail to satisfy what recent theorists have 
called a vehicle criterion, which requires of genuine cognitive penetration that perceptual 
processing must draw information or representations directly from cognitive systems 
[Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis 2015: 27]. More weakly, some have allowed for indirect connections 
[Macpherson 2012], while also maintaining that the connection must be internal and mental 
[Stokes 2013]. Attention-shift cases best described in terms of causal schema (a) do not count as 
cognitive penetration by failure of all of these criteria. But on one plausible analysis, this is not 
true of phenomena that are best described in terms of causal schema (b). 
 
First note that a phenomenon that fits (b) does not involve (any relevant) intermediate action, 
nor does it involve a shift in spatial attention. Recall further that neural correlates for selective 
attention are found in visual areas such as V4 of the extrastriate cortex. Moreover, an observable 
signature of selective attention mechanisms like feature-based attention and object-based 
attention is saccadic eye movement patterns. Many researchers would count these physical 
activities—V4 activity and involuntary saccadic eye movement patterns—as part of visual 
processing and, therefore, count (some of) selective attention as part of, rather than antecedent to, 
visual processing. Finally, there is principled reason to carve up the space in this same way. What 
these selection mechanisms do is change the salience of a perceiver’s immediate environment, in 
effect changing what the eyes pick up. And this is part of what perception itself does.  If this 
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analysis is correct, then a phenomenon that is best-described in terms of (b) involves a direct 
cognitive (and certainly an internal, mental) effect on perception. Since the intermediary selection 
mechanisms as schematized in (b) are part of perceptual processing (and as argued above, have 
an influence on perceptual experience), cognitive modulation of those mechanisms is cognitive 
modulation of perception. So, a phenomenon that fits (b) is cognitive penetration.8  
 
One rejoinder says that the phenomena discussed here are or involve instances of spatial 
attention. For example, behaviourally sensitive changes in feature selection could enhance 
sensitivity just to those spaces where the features are present, and perhaps one would want to 
call this “spatial attention”. However, this would not amount to an instance of schema (a), since 
‘attention’ in that schema has been defined in terms of attentional spotlight or focus, sometimes 
actively controlled by the agent, and this follows the analyses given by Fodor, Pylyshyn, and 
others. So, if one theorizes some of these mechanisms as nuanced forms of spatial attention, and 
those mechanisms are cognitively sensitive and influence perception, this would just be an 
additional example of attention-mediated cognitive effects on perception, not dismissed as an 
attention-shift.9  
 
A second rejoinder insists that selective attention and perception are, always, separate mental 
processes. Such a theorist would then claim that a phenomenon fitting (b) is not cognitive 
penetration for failure to satisfy the directness (or vehicle) criterion described above. However, 
here it is important to ask why directness is supposed to be required for cognitive penetration. 
                                                
8 Similarly, Mole [2015] argues against the claim that attention serves only as a gate-keeper between cognition and 
perception, at most changing the input to separable perceptual processes. Mole adduces recent empirical work by 
Kravtiz and Behrmann [2011] that suggests that colour, shape, and object perception, as well as visually detected 
orthographic categories, are not downstream from attention, but instead are richly intertwined with covert 
attentional selection, the latter of which is apparently sensitive to learnt cognitive information. Mole buttresses this 
analysis (following his own philosophical theory of attention [2011]) with an “integrated competition” model of 
attention, which “has no room for the idea that attention stands as a partition between cognition and perception” 
[Mole 2015: 233].  
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for criticism on this point.       
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One diagnosis is this: a direct cognitive effect on perception is the best evidence that we could 
have for a cognitive-perceptual phenomenon of important consequence. Direct cognitive 
influence on perceptual processing would provide the clearest threat for the modularity of 
sensory systems, and imply important consequences for the knowledge providing role of 
perceptual experience. Suppose that this is correct. It only implies that the directness criterion is 
an evidentialist criterion in a weak sense: direct effects are, in principle, the best or most easily 
identified evidence for cognitive penetration. This alone does not imply that direct effects are the 
only types of relevant effect, nor that evidence for directness is the only evidence of relevance. 
Indeed, if directness is at most an evidentialist (or operationalist) criterion, then to insist that 
directness is a necessary condition for the phenomenon is to set the bar for cognitive penetration 
in a way that is unprincipled, and in favour of the sceptic. Instead, it seems, it is not the 
directeness of the cognitive effect that is essential but the consequences.  
 
The question then becomes: what does a phenomenon fitting (b) imply about the consequences? 
Recall that a modular theory of perceptual systems maintains that perceptual processing is 
informationally encapsulated. A phenomenon that fits (b) would plausibly violate this condition, 
since intermediary selective attention is sensitive to the perceiver’s learned cognitive states. This 
selectivity, of features or objects, directly influences the informational processing of perceptual 
systems. And as hypothesized above, this kind of attentional selection may operate non-
agentially and independently of spatial attention. Therefore, perception is not informationally 
encapsulated relative to cognitive information. It is instead sensitive to learned individual and 
cultural differences. This is especially perspicuous in the empirical studies discussed above, 
where perceptual processing—evidenced by behavioural, eye-tracking, and EEG results—varies 
with linguistic concepts or knowledge. These results suggest that informational processing is 
sensitive to something more than only “purely” visual features of the external stimuli. So, even if 
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the causal process runs from cognition through attention to perception, the standard modular 
cognition/perception architecture is called into question. 
 
Now consider the epistemological consequence (concerning theory-ladenness or general 
empirical knowledge). Fodor was clear that modular systems are epistemically preferable. 
Perceptual processing independent of background beliefs, goals, and intention will more rapidly 
and reliably deliver objective representations about the immediate environment [Fodor 1983, 
1985, 1988]. And so as these cognitive influences go up, the relevant perceptual independence 
goes down. Recall that the answer to Q4 above was that selective attention can influence what 
(and for how long) objects or features are experienced, what “pops-out” in experience or is 
salient, and how experience is structured. And recall that selective attention can affect perceptual 
salience and structure without the perceiver acting to bring about the changes, nor changing or 
manipulating input from the perceptible environment. These are genuine perceptual effects. 
Insofar as these effects are sensitive to background cognitive information, rather than just 
features of the immediate environment, the independence of perceptual representation is called 
into question. Thus, some epistemic consequence for perception follows.10 
 
One might object: “Surely these effects are too minor to sound sceptical alarm bells. In the 
empirical studies discussed, for example, there were no massive errors made and no illusions 
suffered. So why should we be worried about the epistemic role of perception on the basis of 
evidenced phenomena that fit (b)?” An important lesson can be gleaned from this rejoinder. 
While it is important to note that some perceptual error, or loss in efficiency, did occur in the 
studies on linguistic effects, it is more important to note that the relevant epistemological 
consequence need not be pernicious. This is typically, and sometimes explicitly, supposed. But 
                                                
10 Thanks to Chris Mole for helpful suggestions on this point.  
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there is no principled reason to assume that cognitive penetration, should it occur, is bound to 
produce epistemic problems. In other words, the epistemic consequence can be stated neutrally. 
What matters is that cognition affects perception in some important way with respect to the 
knowledge-providing role of perception. In Fodor's terms, but contrary to his conclusion, 
epistemic independence of perception may not be necessary or even especially crucial to 
objective perceptual representation. And in fact, this kind of effect could be epistemically 
boosting, rather than downgrading (see Lyons [2011]; Stokes [2013, 2014]; Siegel [2013]; Vance 
[2015]). 
 
One clear way to bring out this possibility is to consider expertise. Subjects in the Moores et al. 
[2007] and related experiments had to have some minimal linguistic expertise. Absent that 
expertise, there is no relevant perceptual effect, and accordingly no relevant effect on the 
perceptual judgments that subjects make about the visual field, nor an effect on performance 
time or accuracy. Thus linguistic expertise influences, it seems, perception in a way that in turn 
influences reports and doxastic commitment. There is rich experimental literature on experts in 
more specialized domains, worthy of brief mention at least for illustration. For example, 
radiologists reliably identify abnormalities in rapidly presented (200ms) chest radiographs. Eye-
tracking studies corroborate these results by revealing substantially different scan patterns 
between experts and controls: expert radiologists make fewer total saccadic eye-movements and 
fixate more quickly on abnormalities [Drew et al. 2013; Evans et al. 2013]. These and many other 
cases of empirically studied perceptual expertise are candidate examples of epistemically 
enhancing cognitive penetration. Consideration of these cases should at least encourage caution 
about the assumption that the epistemic consequence of cognitive penetration must be 
pernicious (see Bukach et al. [2006] and Scott [2011]).  
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This concludes the argument that attention-involving cognitive effects on perception need not 
take the form of causal schema (a). Instead, there is good reason to think that phenomena 
described in terms of causal schema (b) are possible, and substantial empirical evidence that 
actual phenomena do fit this very schema. Finally, and in answer to the central question of this 
paper, these are plausibly attention-mediated instances of cognitive penetration.11  
 
3. Concluding lessons 
This is progress for the cognitive penetration debate. The framework offered here moves 
beyond a simple assumption of extant theorists. That assumption is captured by the following 
conditional claim: If attention is part of the causal explanation of a relation between cognition 
and perception, then that relation is not cognitive penetration. This conditional is true only if 
one grants the further assumption that the following causal schema is the only possible one.  
 
 (a) Cognitive state  ➔ Attention-shift ➔Perceptual experience 
 
But there is an additional important causal schema: 
 
  (b) Cognitive state  ➔  Non-agential selective attention➔ Perceptual experience  
 
                                                
11 Wu [forthcoming] gives an analysis in the same spirit and comes to the same general conclusion as this one, but the 
emphasis and the mode of analysis are substantively distinct. Wu, like Raftopoulos [2011] and Cecchi [2014], takes 
violation of informational encapsulation to be an important marker for cognitive penetration. Wu’s central question 
is whether background cognitive states directly influence the computational processing in visual structures. Wu 
argues, by appeal to neurological studies on Macaque monkeys and computational models, that intention modulates 
visual attention; and because intention is cognitive and attention is an “aspect” of vision, this counts as cognitive 
penetration. So Wu’s analysis centrally concerns penetration of perceptual processing and directness, by contrast to 
the emphasis here on perceptual experience and theoretical and epistemic consequences. But like this paper, Wu 
partly emphasizes selective attention and explicitly notes the importance of epistemological consequences of 
intention-involving cases of cognitive penetration.  
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 So the assumed conditional is false. There are other ways that attention could be involved in 
cognitive effects on perception. This is the first lesson. 
 
The second lesson is that, if this analysis has been successful, any actual psychological 
phenomenon that fits schema (b) is cognitive penetration. And this changes the dialectical space. 
The question now becomes, in the context of thinking about attention and cognitive penetration, 
are there any actual phenomena appropriately described to fit schema (b)? The sceptic must 
motivate a ‘no’ in answer to this question. And he must do this in the face of the mounting 
evidence from perceptual psychology discussed here. Put strongly, in the context of thinking 
about attention and cognitive penetration, the sceptic’s position is thereby undermined. The 
more cautious conclusion is that, at the very least, the burden of proof shifts to the sceptics, to 
those who deny the cognitive penetration of perception.  
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